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 NOTE 
A Narrow Escape: Transcending the GID 
Exclusion in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act 
Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. 
May 18, 2017) 
Taylor Payne* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was implemented in 
1990 and is hailed as a pivotal piece of legislation that protects the civil rights 
of individuals with disabilities.1  Driven by the prejudice of certain influential 
legislators, transgender individuals were purposefully excluded from the 
ADA’s protection.2  This exclusion – commonly referred to as the “GID Ex-
clusion” – ensured that “transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not 
resulting from physical impairments” were not considered a “disability” un-
der the ADA.3  The GID Exclusion effectively produced a categorical bar for 
transgender plaintiffs seeking legal recourse under the ADA despite the fact 
that many transgender individuals experience clinically significant stress 
known as Gender Dysphoria, a recognized and serious medical condition that 
can substantially limit major life activities.4 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Missouri 
School of Law; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.  I am grateful to 
Professor Anne Alexander and the entire Missouri Law Review staff for their guid-
ance and encouragement in writing this Note. 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 
(1990). 
 2. See 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statements of Sen. 
Harkin), Cong. Rec S 10765-01, at 1989 WL 183216. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012) (“Disability shall not include . . . transsexu-
alism [or] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(finding an employer’s requirement that transgender employee use men’s restroom 
did not violate the ADA because “transsexualism is excluded from the definition of 
disability no matter how it is characterized, whether as a physical impairment, a men-
tal disorder, or some combination thereof”), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004); 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS Gender Dysphoria § 302.6, at 455 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] 
(listing clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning as consequence of Gender Dysphoria). 
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For almost two decades following the passage of the ADA, the GID Ex-
clusion was left virtually unchallenged.  Moreover, transgender plaintiffs who 
tried to invoke the ADA’s protections were unsuccessful – that is until 2014, 
when Kate Lynn Blatt (“Blatt”) brought suit in federal court.5  Blatt, a 
transgender woman with Gender Dysphoria,6 alleged she was either covered 
under the ADA or the ADA’s exclusions were unconstitutional.7  Blatt’s suit 
marks one of the few times the GID Exclusion has been challenged and the 
only time in which a court has held the ADA does not categorically bar 
transgender plaintiffs from protection.8 
This Note discusses the groundbreaking ruling of Blatt v. Cabela’s Re-
tail, Inc. and its potential impact on transgender individuals in the public and 
legal spheres.  Part II of this Note provides the pertinent facts and holding 
from Blatt.  Part III discusses the history of the ADA and the impetus for the 
GID Exclusion.  Part III then turns to the current legal landscape for 
transgender individuals at the national and state level.  Part IV details the 
instant decision and explores the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania’s legal reasoning and holding.  Part V addresses arguments 
for and against the holding of the instant decision, detailing positions argued 
by the United States of America and amici curiae in the case. 
Ultimately, Part V argues that Blatt should be recognized as a momen-
tous decision.  Not all transgender individuals have Gender Dysphoria9 and 
therefore they may not always be able to invoke the protections found in the 
ADA on that basis.10  However, for transgender individuals who do experi-
ence Gender Dysphoria, Blatt provides hope that decades-old prejudice en-
shrined in federal legislation can be overcome through reasonable statutory 
 
 5. See Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123 
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
 6. Individuals are diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria when they experience 
clinically significant stress that results from “[a] marked incongruence between expe-
rienced/expressed gender and [gender assigned at birth].”  See DSM-V, supra note 4, 
§ 302.6, at 455. 
 7. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2. 
 8. Id. at *4; see also Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1001–02; Rentos v. Oce-
Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 
1996). 
 9. See Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Mazzoni 
Center, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Center for Transgender Equali-
ty, National LGBTQ Task Force, and Transgender Law Center in Opposition to De-
fendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss at 3, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 (No. 5:14-cv-
04822) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae] (noting that many transgender individuals 
do not experience stress related to their transgender status; “they are completely com-
fortable living just the way they are [without medical or other intervention].”). 
 10. The specifics of a particular case would determine whether a transgender 
individual without Gender Dysphoria would be covered under the ADA.  Theoretical-
ly, even a transgender individual without Gender Dysphoria might enjoy ADA protec-
tion, provided they were discriminated against because they were “regarded as” hav-
ing Gender Dysphoria.  See text accompanying infra note 51. 
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interpretation, resulting in much needed legal protections for a community 
that still faces “severe and pervasive discrimination in nearly every aspect [of 
life].”11 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2014, Blatt filed suit against her former employer, Cabela’s Retail, 
Inc. (“Cabela’s”), for impermissible sex discrimination in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and impermissible discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability under the ADA.12  Blatt sought an award of 
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney’s fees, and other relief.13  
In response, Cabela’s filed a motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claim.14  Ulti-
mately, Cabela’s motion to dismiss was denied.15 
Cabela’s is a retail business that specializes in outdoor equipment and 
clothing.16  In September 2006, Cabela’s hired Blatt as a seasonal stocker.17  
One year before she was hired, Blatt was diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria,18 
sometimes referred to as Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”).19  Blatt was as-
signed male at birth, but she identifies as female.20  Blatt engaged in hormone 
therapy, grew her hair long, dressed in female attire, and changed her name in 
order to conform to her female gender.21 
As part of her employment at Cabela’s, Blatt was required to attend an 
employee orientation at which she dressed in women’s clothing and used the 
women’s restroom without any problem.22  Following orientation, Blatt re-
quested a female uniform23 and began wearing one when she did not receive a 
 
 11. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 1. 
 12. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *1. 
 13. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 1, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 
(No. 5:14-cv-04822). 
 14. See Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Our History, CABELA’S: WORLD’S FOREMOST OUTFITTER, 
https://www.cabelas.com/content.jsp?pageName=history (last visited June 25, 2018); 
see First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 14 (“Blatt was 
excited to begin her employment with the Defendant, as she is an active participant in 
outdoor sports, and highly knowledgeable about the same.”). 
 17. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶¶ 12–13. 
 18. Id. ¶ 10; see supra text accompanying note 6. 
 19. “Gender Identity Disorder” was removed from DSM-V and replaced with 
“Gender Dysphoria”; the two have different diagnostic criteria.  See discussion infra 
Section III.A. 
 20. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 9. 
 21. Id. ¶ 11. 
 22. Id. ¶ 15. 
 23. These requests were made as requests for reasonable accommodations.  Id. ¶ 
16. 
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response to her request.24  Blatt also requested a nametag that read “Kate 
Lynn” as a reasonable accommodation for her Gender Dysphoria, but 
Cabela’s Human Resources Director denied her request.25  Blatt’s complaint 
alleged that, in retaliation for requesting the female nametag, the Human Re-
sources Director forced her to wear a nametag that read “James.”26  Addition-
ally, the Human Resources Director commanded all other employees to refer 
to Blatt as “James” or they would be fired.27  Blatt also alleged that the Hu-
man Resources Director told her she could receive a nametag reading “Kate 
Lynn” only after she legally changed her name and gender marker.28  The 
Human Resources Director also prohibited Blatt from continuing to use the 
women’s restroom until her gender marker was legally changed.29  Moreover, 
Blatt was often secluded and forced to work alone, unlike other non-
transgender employees who often worked in teams.30 
Approximately one month after she was hired, Blatt was called in for an 
abrupt meeting with one of Cabela’s shift supervisors who accused Blatt of 
“failing to pull her weight” and suggested she consider quitting.31  Following 
this meeting, Blatt was subjected to numerous derogatory and offensive 
comments by fellow employees, including being called “‘he/she,’ ‘ladyboy,’ 
‘fag,’ ‘sinner,’ and ‘freak.’”32  Employees also asked offensive questions 
about Blatt’s body.33  Blatt reported the discrimination against her to a differ-
ent Cabela’s supervisor (“Supervisor Bowers”), who reported the discrimina-
tion to Cabela’s upper management, including the Human Resources Direc-
tor.34  However, neither upper management nor the Human Resources Direc-
tor attempted to investigate the matter or take steps to prevent further dis-
crimination.35 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. 
 26. Id. ¶ 18.  “James” was the name given to Blatt when she was born.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 27. Id. ¶ 18. 
 28. Id.  A gender marker is the designation on an official identity document or 
other identity form that lists one’s gender.  Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for 
Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 70 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862 (2015), 
https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdf [hereinafter APA Guide-
lines].  Transgender individuals often encounter administrative and legal barriers that 
hinder them from accurately reflecting their gender identity on driver’s licenses, pass-
ports, etc.  Robyn B. Gigl, Transgender: Understanding Who the “T” in “LGBT” Are 
and Their Unique Legal Issues, N.J. LAW., June 2013, at 10, 17. 
 29. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 19. 
 30. Id. ¶ 23. 
 31. Id. ¶ 20. 
 32. Id. ¶ 21. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. ¶ 22. 
 35. Id. 
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Blatt applied for a promotion approximately two months after she was 
hired and at various points thereafter in the course of her employment.36  A 
Cabela’s supervisor told Blatt that the corporate office had specifically or-
dered him not to promote Blatt even though he thought Blatt was “well-
qualified” for the promotion.37  After applying for one promotion, Blatt over-
heard a maintenance manager tell Supervisor Bowers that Blatt was a “con-
fused sicko” and that he would not interview Blatt “under any circumstanc-
es.”38 
Even after Blatt legally changed her name and gender marker, Cabela’s 
Human Resources Director refused to allow her access to the women’s re-
stroom,39 citing the unfounded belief that Blatt would pose a danger to other 
women.40  Supervisor Bowers told Blatt that the staff wished her to use a 
gender-neutral restroom at a Dunkin’ Donuts across the street.41  When Blatt 
refused, Cabela’s reluctantly allowed her to use a family unisex restroom at 
the front of the store, which was still significantly farther away than the em-
ployee restrooms.42  After Blatt legally changed her name, Cabela’s issued 
her three incorrect nametags43 before finally providing her with a nametag 
that correctly stated her name.44 
According to Blatt’s complaint, in February 2007, Blatt “amicably ap-
proached” a maintenance technician and asked about her cleaning schedule.45  
In response, the technician yelled at Blatt and blamed her for disrupting the 
schedule.46  Blatt was subsequently fired for allegedly threatening the techni-
cian’s son during the altercation.47  Blatt did not know the technician had a 
son and denied making any such threats.48  Blatt claimed Cabela’s articulated 
reason for terminating her “was[ ] pretextual and her employment was actual-
 
 36. Compare id. ¶ 25 (applying for a promotion around “November of 2006 and 
continuing throughout the course of her employment”), with id. ¶ 12 (starting work in 
September 2006).  Blatt’s complaint alleges she had excellent job performance.  Id. ¶ 
25. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. ¶ 26. 
 39. Blatt was under the impression she would be able to use the women’s re-
stroom after she legally changed her name and gender marker.  See id. ¶ 28. 
 40. Id. ¶ 29. 
 41. Id. ¶ 30.  As Blatt was denied use of the female restroom as a reasonable 
accommodation, she requested a gender-neutral restroom as a reasonable accommo-
dation.  See id. ¶¶ 29–30. 
 42. Id. ¶ 31. 
 43. Blatt’s complaint stated that she thought an incorrect nametag was provided 
to her on three separate occasions intentionally in an effort to degrade her.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. ¶ 33. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. ¶ 34.  The technician “was neither terminated nor disciplined for her in-
volvement in said altercation.”  Id. ¶ 35. 
 48. Id. ¶ 34. 
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ly terminated based on her sex, her actual and/or perceived disability and/or 
record of impairment, and in retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination 
in the workplace and requesting a reasonable accommodation for her disabil-
ity.”49  After she was fired, Blatt filed suit against Cabela’s alleging unlawful 
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the ADA.50 
“The ADA makes it unlawful for a covered employer to discriminate 
against any ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability.’”51  To bring suit 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [they52 are] disabled within 
the meaning of the ADA,53 (2) [they are] a qualified individual under the 
ADA, 54 and (3) [they] suffered an adverse employment action because of 
[their] disability.”55  “Disability” under the ADA includes “physical or mental 
impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activities.”56  Blatt 
asserted her Gender Dysphoria substantially limited one or more of her major 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 36. 
 50. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
 51. EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012)). 
 52. Throughout this Note, singular “they” is used in order to respect and 
acknowledge nonbinary individuals; the author believes that “they” should be the 
default singular pronoun for an individual of unknown gender, rather than utilizing 
“he or she.”  See Singular ‘They’, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/words-at-play/singular-nonbinary-they (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 53. “Disability” under the ADA is a broad concept; a person is covered under the 
ADA if they are discriminated against based on (1) a real disability, (2) a perceived 
disability or (2) a record of such impairment.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).  An indi-
vidual is also covered by the ADA if the person has – currently or in the past – a med-
ical condition that, without treatment, would be substantially limiting.  See id. § 
12102(4)(E)(i) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigat-
ing measures.”). 
 54. “The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires.”  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). 
 55. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d at 969 (quoting Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 
1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013)); Young v. Warner–Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021 
(8th Cir. 1998)). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
 
[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, per-
forming manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, 
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, think-
ing, communicating, and working . . . .  [A] major life activity also includes 
the operation of major bodily functions, including but not limited to, functions 
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neuro-
logical, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. 
 
Id. § 12102(2)(A)–(B). 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss3/10
2018] TRANSCENDING THE GID EXCLUSION 805 
life activities including, but not limited to, reproducing, social and occupa-
tional functioning, and interacting with others.57  Thus, Blatt alleged her 
Gender Dysphoria met the criteria of a disability and entitled her to protection 
under the ADA.58 
Cabela’s filed a motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claim, asserting that 
Blatt failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.59  Cabela’s 
argued the explicit text of the ADA – in particular § 12211, which excludes 
from the definition of disability “gender identity disorders not resulting from 
physical impairments”60 – applied to Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria and precluded 
her from bringing a viable ADA claim.61  Blatt argued her condition was cov-
ered under the ADA or, in the alternative, that if her condition was excluded 
from the scope of the ADA’s coverage, then the GID Exclusion violated her 
right to equal protection as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.62 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judge 
Joseph F. Leeson Jr. presiding, narrowly construed the text of the ADA’s 
GID Exclusion and held that Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria is a covered disability 
under the ADA.63  Judge Leeson construed the ADA’s language narrowly to 
avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the GID Exclusion.64 
The ADA’s GID Exclusion provides that “gender identity disorders not 
resulting from physical impairment” are not disabilities under the ADA.65  
Judge Leeson held that the term “gender identity disorders” referred “only 
[to] the [state] of identifying with a . . . gender [other than the one to which 
an individual is assigned at birth].”66  Judge Leeson further held that clinical-
ly disabling conditions, like Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria, “go[] beyond” simply 
identifying with a gender other than the one assigned.67  Thus, disabling con-
ditions like Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria are not included in the narrowly con-
 
 57. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 10. 
 58. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
 59. Id. at *1. 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012). 
 61. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at *3–4. 
 64. Id. at *2–3 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957)) (“The constitutional-avoidance canon pre-
scribes that ‘[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and 
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that [the 
court] will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided.’ . . . .  Thus, if there is a ‘fairly possible’ interpre-
tation of § 12211 that permits the Court to avoid the constitutional question Blatt has 
raised, the Court must adopt that interpretation.”). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 12211. 
 66. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2. 
 67. Id. 
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strued term “gender identity disorders” and therefore are not barred from 
coverage as a disability under the ADA.68 
As Part IV of this Note will further explore, Judge Leeson arrived at this 
conclusion by invoking the constitutional-avoidance canon and further by 
looking to the text of the ADA’s GID Exclusion and attempting to render it 
internally consistent.69  Because Judge Leeson found that Blatt did experience 
clinically significant stress (as reflected in her official Gender Dysphoria 
diagnosis), he held that the ADA did not exclude her from its protection.70  
Cabela’s motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claim was denied.71 
Of particular note in the instant case are the statements of interest sub-
mitted by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).72  In its first Statement of 
Interest, the DOJ asked the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to avoid ruling 
on the constitutionality of the ADA’s GID Exclusion and instead asked the 
court to resolve Blatt’s claim under Title VII alone.73  The DOJ dodged opin-
ing about the constitutionality of the GID Exclusion and did not provide any 
analysis of Blatt’s ADA claim.74  Subsequently, the DOJ was specifically 
ordered by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to address the ADA claim in 
a second statement of interest.75  The DOJ’s Second Statement of Interest and 
the arguments of amici curiae – various lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (“LGBT”) advocacy organizations – are further discussed in Part 
V of this Note.76 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section A first addresses terms and definitions related to gender.  Sec-
tion B then briefly details the ADA, including when and to whom it applies, 
its mandates, and what plaintiffs must show in order to support a viable cause 
of action under its provisions.  Section C explains that transgender plaintiffs 
have not often sought protection under the ADA and further explains that 
protection for transgender plaintiffs has been denied in the limited instances 
 
 68. Id. at *4.  In other words, Judge Leeson differentiated between a plaintiff 
whose internal sense of gender differs from their gender assigned at birth (i.e., some-
one who is transgender) and a person who experiences clinically significant stress 
related to their gender identity (i.e., someone with Gender Dysphoria).  See id. at *3–
4. 
 69. See id. at *2–3. 
 70. Id. at *4. 
 71. Id. at *5. 
 72. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt, 2017 WL 
2178123 (No. 5:14-cv-04822) [hereinafter First Statement of Interest]; Second State-
ment of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 (No. 5:14-
cv-04822) [hereinafter Second Statement of Interest]. 
 73. First Statement of Interest, supra note 72. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Second Statement of Interest, supra note 72. 
 76. See infra Section V.C. 
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in which ADA suits have been filed.  Section D then explores current legal 
protections utilized by transgender plaintiffs who experience discrimination 
and discusses how those protections have developed over time.  Sections E 
and F conclude this Part by exploring recent legal developments with respect 
to the rights of transgender individuals. 
A. Understanding Terms and Definitions Related to Gender 
As our understanding of gender evolves, so, too, does the language we 
use to conceptualize it.  There are various terms in modern vernacular that 
were not widely known or used in previous decades, and this Section de-
scribes a few such terms pertinent to the instant case. 
“Gender identity” refers to someone’s deeply felt, inherent sense of be-
ing a man, woman, or other gender (e.g., non-binary, genderqueer, etc.).77  
“Transgender” is an umbrella term used to describe someone whose internal 
sense of gender differs from the gender they were assigned at birth.78  In this 
Note, “gender assigned at birth” is used rather than “sex assigned at birth.”  
This Note uses “gender” rather than “sex” in this context because when the 
term “sex assigned at birth” is used, gender assigned at birth is typically what 
is being conveyed and intended – a person’s sex is more difficult to determine 
than commonly understood.79  Moreover, the definition and understanding of 
 
 77. GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender, GLAAD, 
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [hereinafter GLAAD Guide]. 
 
Non-binary and/or genderqueer [are t]erms used by some people who experi-
ence their gender identity and/or gender expression as falling outside the cate-
gories of man and woman.  They may define their gender as falling some-
where in between man and woman, or they may define it as wholly different 
from these terms.  The term is not a synonym 
for transgender or transsexual and should only be used if someone self-
identifies as non-binary and/or genderqueer . . . . Gender nonconforming [is] a 
term used to describe some people whose gender expression is different from 
conventional expectations of masculinity and femininity.  Please note that not 
all gender non-conforming people identify as transgender; nor are all 
transgender people gender non-conforming.  Many people have gender ex-
pressions that are not entirely conventional – that fact alone does not make 
them transgender.  Many transgender men and women have gender expres-
sions that are conventionally masculine or feminine.  Simply being 
transgender does not make someone gender non-conforming.  The term is not 
a synonym for transgender or transsexual and should only be used if someone 
self-identifies as gender non-conforming. 
 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 78. APA Guidelines, supra note 28, at 832; see also GLAAD Guide, supra note 
77. 
 79. See Gender and Genetics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/genomics/gender/en/index1.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) 
(“[T]here is a range of chromosome complements, hormone balances, and phenotypic 
9
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“sex” is influenced by social and cultural norms as much as the understanding 
of “gender.”80 
GID is an outdated diagnostic term the medical community formerly 
used to diagnose and treat transgender individuals.81  The term is found in the 
ADA’s exclusions – hence the shorthand “GID Exclusion” – because the 
drafters of the GID Exclusion extrapolated their exclusionary language from 
the preeminent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition Revised (“DSM-III-R”), which was authoritative circa 1990.82  GID 
appeared in two editions (including their respective revised editions) of the 
 
variations that determine sex.”).  WHO details how certain conditions, such as Kline-
felter syndrome, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), and Androgen Insensitivity 
Syndrome (AIS) can affect the appearance of secondary sex characteristics – which 
are commonly used to determine the “sex” of an infant.  See id.  For instance, “An-
drogen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) is an X-linked recessive disorder in which af-
fected individuals have external female genitalia and breast development despite 
being [designated as] genetically male (46XY).”  Id. 
 80. See PENELOPE ECKHERT & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, LANGUAGE AND 
GENDER 1–2 (2013). 
 
[W]hile we think of sex as biological and gender as social, this distinction is 
not clear-cut.  People tend to think of gender as the result of nurture – as social 
and hence fluid – while sex is the result of nature, simply given by biology. 
However, nature and nurture intertwine, and there is no obvious point at 
which sex leaves off and gender begins. 
 
Id. at 2.   
 
A sharp demarcation between sex and gender ultimately fails because 
there  
 
is no single objective biological criterion for [sex. The determination of an in-
dividual’s s]ex is based [on] a combination of anatomical, endocrinal, and 
chromosomal features, and the selection among these criteria for sex assign-
ment is based very much on cultural beliefs about what actually makes some-
one male or female.  Thus the very definition of the biological categories male 
and female, and people’s understanding of themselves and others as male or 
female, is ultimately social . . . . “[L]abeling someone a man or a woman is a 
social decision. We may use scientific knowledge to help us make the deci-
sion, but only our beliefs about gender – not science – can define our sex. Fur-
thermore, our beliefs about gender affect what kinds of knowledge scientists 
produce about sex in the first place.” 
 
Id. (quoting ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY (2000)). 
 81. See e.g., Gender Identity Disorders: Transsexualism, Gender Identity Disor-
der of Childhood, and Atypical Gender Identity Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed., rev. 1987); 
Gender Identity Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., 1994). 
 82. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 12.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 12211 
(2012). 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as a recognized medi-
cal condition.83  Many advocates of the transgender community took issue 
with GID as the name of the medical condition; advocates felt this name en-
dorsed the notion that being transgender was a deviant mental disorder.84 
In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edi-
tion (“DSM-V”), published in 2013, the American Psychiatric Association 
(“APA”) removed GID, replaced it with “Gender Dysphoria,” and revised the 
underlying diagnostic criteria.85  Gender Dysphoria refers to the clinically 
significant stress that accompanies the “marked incongruence” between one’s 
internal sense of gender and their gender assigned at birth.86  Not every 
transgender person has Gender Dysphoria – some transgender individuals do 
not experience clinically significant stress related to their gender identity.87  
Often, those who do not experience clinically significant stress do not seek 
medical intervention, such as hormone therapy or surgery.88 
In addition to “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical im-
pairment,” the ADA’s GID Exclusion prohibits coverage for “transsexual-
ism.”89  “Transsexual” is an older term, though some individuals still prefer 
 
 83. See e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS Gender Identity Disorders §§ 302.5, 302.60, 302.82, at 261–
66 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].  GID was listed in different forms in DSM-IV 
and DSM-III.  See, e.g., DSM-III, supra § 302.60 (Gender Identity Disorder of Child-
hood); id. § 302.85 (Atypical Gender Identity Order). 
 84. See Camille Beredjick, DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder ‘Gender 
Dysphoria,’ THE ADVOC. (July 23, 2012, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-gender-
identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria. 
 85. Compare DSM-V, supra note 4, § 302.6, with DSM-III, supra note 83.  Brief 
of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 17. 
 86. See DSM-V, supra note 4, § 302.6, at 455. 
 87. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 4. 
 88. See id. (“[T]hey are completely comfortable living just the way they are.”). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(1) (2012).  The exclusions in § 12211 also prohibit cover-
age for “transvestites,” although this exclusion is not especially relevant for 
transgender individuals.  Id.  “Transvestite” is a particularly antiquated term and was 
typically used to “refer to men who occasionally wear clothes, makeup, and accesso-
ries culturally associated with women.”  GLAAD Guide, supra note 77.   Now more 
commonly referred to as “cross-dressing,” “transvestitism” describes a form of gender 
expression. 
 
Gender expression [refers to e]xternal manifestations of gender, expressed 
through a person’s name, pronouns, clothing, haircut, behavior, voice, and/or 
body characteristics.  Society identifies these cues as masculine and feminine, 
although what is considered masculine or feminine changes over time and var-
ies by culture.  Typically, transgender people seek to align their gender ex-
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to self-identify as transsexual.90  The term refers to an individual who has 
changed or seeks to change their body through medical intervention.91  Un-
like “transgender,” “transsexual” is not an umbrella term, and many 
transgender individuals do not identify as transsexual.92 
B. Overview of the ADA 
Recognizing that individuals with disabilities continually encounter var-
ious forms of discrimination, Congress enacted the ADA to provide clear and 
enforceable standards to address and eradicate such discrimination.93  The 
ADA “prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all are-
as of public life, including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and 
private places that are open to the general public.”94  An individual is consid-
ered “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA if they have a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, if they have a 
record of such impairment, or if they are regarded as having such impair-
ment.95  In addition to making discrimination on the basis of disability unlaw-
ful, the ADA mandates “reasonable accommodations” for individuals with 
disabilities in various circumstances and prohibits retaliation for requesting 
reasonable accommodations.96  Government agencies, such as the DOJ, regu-
late and enforce the provisions of the ADA.97 
 
Id.  “Transvestites” are typically cisgender – that is, their gender identity matches 
their gender assigned at birth.  See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 94. An Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA NAT’L NETWORK, 
https://adata.org/factsheet/ADA-overview (last visited June 25, 2018).  For example, 
“the ADA prohibits discrimination in all employment practices, including job applica-
tion procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.  It applies to recruitment, advertising, ten-
ure, layoff, leave, fringe benefits, and all other employment-related activities.”  The 
ADA: Questions and Answers, EEOC, 
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/publications/adaqa1.cfm?renderforprint=1 (last visited 
June 25, 2018). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(a) (2012); see also supra notes 51–62 and accompany-
ing text. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); see also An Overview of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, supra note 94. 
 
Reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment to a job or the 
work environment that will enable a qualified applicant or employee with a 
disability to participate in the application process or to perform essential job 
functions.  Reasonable accommodation also includes adjustments to assure 
that a qualified individual with a disability has rights and privileges in em-
ployment equal to those of [employees without disabilities.] 
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To establish a prima facie claim of employment discrimination under 
the ADA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [they are] disabled within the mean-
ing of the ADA,98 (2) [they are] a qualified individual under the ADA, 99 and 
(3) [they] suffered an adverse employment action because of [their] disabil-
ity.”100  This burden is different for retaliation claims101 and claims related to 
the failure to reasonably accommodate.102 
C. Transgender Plaintiffs Have Not Historically Found Redress Under 
the ADA 
While the ADA has protected the civil rights of many individuals with 
disabilities since its enactment, it has not proven useful for transgender indi-
viduals seeking recourse under its mandates.  Although some federal courts, 
including federal courts of appeal, have held that sex discrimination encom-
passes discrimination based on transgender status,103 transgender plaintiffs 
have not generally succeeded in bringing federal discrimination claims under 
the ADA.104  This is because § 12211’s GID Exclusion specifically excludes 
 
The ADA: Questions and Answers, supra note 94. 
 97. An Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 94.  Title I 
(Employment) is regulated and enforced by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission; Title II (Public Services: State and Local Government) and Title III 
(Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities) are regulated and 
enforced by the DOJ; Title IV (Telecommunications) is regulated by the Federal 
Communication Commission.  Id. 
 98. See supra notes 51–62 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 100. EEOC. v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013)).  
 101. Id. at 972.  “[T]o establish . . . a retaliation claim under the ADA, a ‘plaintiff 
must show that (1) [she] engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) the employer 
took an adverse action against [her], and (3) there was a causal connection between 
the adverse action and the protected activity.’”  Id. (quoting Hill, 737 F.3d at 1218). 
 102. Id. at 971. 
 
To show that an employer failed to participate in the interactive process, the 
employee must show: “1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; 
2) the employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disa-
bility; 3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee 
in seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably 
accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.” 
 
Id. (quoting Peyton v. Fred’s Store of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
 103. See infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 104. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(finding an employer’s requirement that transgender employee use men’s restroom 
did not violate the ADA because “transsexualism is excluded from the definition of 
disability no matter how it is characterized, whether as a physical impairment, a men-
tal disorder, or some combination thereof”), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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“transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical 
impairments.”105  Until Blatt, the few federal courts that considered the issue 
generally dismissed ADA claims brought by transgender plaintiffs out-of-
hand due to the text of the GID Exclusion.106 
D. Intent to Exclude Transgender Individuals from Coverage Under 
the ADA 
The ADA was the first comprehensive civil rights law concerning indi-
viduals with disabilities that prohibited discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, employment, public services, and telecommunications.107  The ADA 
was a noteworthy victory for disability advocates who for decades lobbied for 
such protections, but passage of the ADA required last-minute compro-
mise.108  The legislative record demonstrates that Senator Armstrong, Senator 
Hatch, and Senator Helms (who harbored a particularly sharp animus toward 
the LGBT community109) feared that certain individuals – those engaged in 
illegal activities like drug usage and those deemed to lead “immoral” life-
styles, namely, “homosexuals,” “bisexuals,” and “transvestites” – would be 
 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protected only against discrim-
ination on the basis of disability in federal programs and by those programs and activ-
ities receiving federal financial assistance.  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 
794(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–185), preempted by Joren v. Napolitano, 
633 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 2011).  See generally Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 
93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (1982)). 
 108. Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for 
Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 11–23 (2013).   
 
Given the unlikely company in which GID (and Transsexualism) finds it-
self, one might guess that this list was not the result of careful congres-
sional deliberation. And one would be right. This list was a slapdash col-
lection . . . grafted onto the ADA by amendment to ensure passage in the 
Senate.   
 
Id. at 11. 
 109. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01 (statement of Sen. Helms), Cong. Rec. 
S10768, at 1989 WL 183216. 
 
If the Senator will forgive me, I know everybody has a different idea about 
how to draft a piece of legislation.  If this were a bill involving people in a 
wheelchair or those who have been injured in the war, that is one thing.  But 
how in the world did you get to the place that you did not even [ex]clude 
transvestites? How did you get into this business of classifying people who are 





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss3/10
2018] TRANSCENDING THE GID EXCLUSION 813 
covered under the statute.110  The exclusions found in § 12211 were meant to 
quell the Senators’ reservations.111  Some senators knew the exclusions were 
questionable,112 but neither they nor the interested disability advocates were 
prepared to risk the ADA’s passage in the Senate.113  Alas, the exclusions 
were codified.114  For this reason, when transgender plaintiffs face discrimi-
nation in public accommodations, employment practices, and elsewhere, they 
typically seek legal redress under other statutes (and, when appropriate, con-
stitutional provisions).115 
 
 110. See, e.g., id. (“Well, all that is well and good.  What I get out of all of this is 
here comes the U.S. Government telling the employer that he cannot set up any moral 
standards for his business by asking someone if he is HIV positive, even though 85 
percent of those people are engaged in activities that most Americans find abhorrent.  
That is one of the problems I find with this bill.”); see also Barry, supra note 108, at 
14 (alteration in original) (“Echoing Senator Armstrong’s and Rudman’s moral con-
cerns, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) pressed the sponsors on the ADA’s presumptive 
coverage of five groups of individuals: ‘homosexuals’; ‘transvestites’; illegal drug 
users and alcoholics; ‘people who are HIV positive or have active AIDS disease’; and 
those with ‘psychosis, neurosis, or other mental, psychological disease[s] or disor-
der[s],’ namely, pedophilia, schizophrenia, kleptomania, manic depression, intellectu-
al disabilities, and psychotic disorders.”). 
 111. Kevin Berry writes: 
 
GID was excluded from the ADA because, in 1989, a small handful of sena-
tors believed that gender nonconformity – like pedophilia, pyromania, and 
kleptomania – was morally harmful to the community.  In the eleventh hour of 
a marathon floor debate, and in the absence of an organized transgender lob-
by, the ADA’s sponsors and disability rights advocates reluctantly agreed to 
sacrifice GID and nine other mental impairments in exchange for passage in 
the Senate.  The fact that Congress went out of its way to exclude GID, along 
with nine mental impairments that involve some harm to oneself or others, 
sends a strong symbolic message: people with GID have no civil rights worthy 
of respect.  The ADA is a moral code, and people with GID its moral casta-
ways. 
 
Barry, supra note 108, at 1. 
 112. See id. at 14–15 (alternation in original) (quoting 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01 
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), Cong. Rec S 10785, at 1989 WL 183216) (“Senator Harkin 
assured Senator Helms that, even absent an explicit exclusion, homosexuality and 
bisexuality were not covered by the ADA–not for moral reasons, but for medical 
ones. ‘[B]ehavior characteristics’ such as ‘homosexuality and bisexuality are not 
disabilities under any medical standards.’”). 
 113. See Barry, supra note 108, at 24–25. 
 114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012). 
 115. For example, transgender plaintiffs often seek redress under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act and its prohibition of sex discrimination.  See infra note 128. 
Transgender plaintiffs also seek redress under equal protection guarantees of the 
United States Constitution.  See Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299 (N.D. 
Ga. 2010) (holding transgender employee could bring equal protection claim based on 
sex stereotyping), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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E. Current Legal Protections for Transgender Individuals 
Transgender individuals in the United States do not currently enjoy the 
protection of explicit federal civil rights legislation that bars discrimination 
on the basis of gender identity.116  While Congress has been slow to pass ex-
plicit legislation protecting the rights of transgender individuals, federal 
courts and various federal agencies have provided alternate avenues for such 
individuals to assert claims of discrimination based on gender identity, in-
cluding transgender status. 
Title VII provides one such avenue. 117  For transgender plaintiffs, the 
critical question in litigation has commonly been whether discrimination 
based on transgender status constitutes impermissible sex discrimination un-
der Title VII.118  Early appellate decisions held that Title VII’s prohibition on 
sex discrimination did not proscribe discrimination on the basis of 
transgender status.119   However, the legal landscape for transgender individ-
uals shifted significantly following the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.120 
Price Waterhouse concerned a female accountant who was nominated 
for partnership in her accounting firm.121  When she was denied the partner-
ship, she sued under Title VII, claiming that her firm discriminated against 
her on the basis of her sex.122  The plaintiff was told to “walk more feminine-
ly, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
 
 116. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(2012). 
 117. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).  Title VII specifically prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sex, including the hiring and termination of em-
ployees and discrimination “with respect to [an individual’s] compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 118. See infra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 119. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(“[D]iscrimination based on one’s transsexualism does not fall within the protective 
purview of the Act.”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 
1977).  “By the mid-1980s, it was thus settled [law] in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits that Title VII did not prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of 
transgender identity.”  Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 521 (D. 
Conn. 2016) (“[T]hat result was premised in all three Circuits on congressional intent 
and a ‘plain reading’ or ‘traditional definition’ of the word ‘sex.’”). 
 120. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No 102–166, 105 Stat 1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United 
States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). 
 121. Id. at 231. 
 122. Id. at 231–32. 
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styled, and wear jewelry.”123  The Court deemed these comments “clear 
signs” that partners at the plaintiff’s firm were responding adversely to her 
because she was a woman and held that the accounting firm had engaged in 
impermissible sex discrimination.124 
In so holding, the Court recognized that discrimination based on failure 
to conform to gender stereotypes is an actionable form of sex discrimina-
tion.125  Transgender plaintiffs who have succeeded in federal courts have 
often relied on the sex discrimination framework espoused in Price Water-
house.126 
Post-Price Waterhouse, the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that discrimination based on transgender status constitutes 
impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII or the Equal Protection 
 
 123. Id. at 235 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 
(D.D.C. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d by 
490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. No 102–166, 105 Stat 1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571 
U.S. 204 (2014)). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 251. 
 126. See e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that trans plaintiff stated a claim for sex discrimination “by alleging discrim-
ination . . . for [their] failure to conform to sex stereotypes”). 
17
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Clause.127  Numerous U.S. District Courts have reached the same conclu-
sion.128 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is the only federal ap-
pellate court post-Price Waterhouse to maintain the pre-Price Waterhouse 
doctrine on transgender status and Title VII.129  The Tenth Circuit relied on 
the “traditional” sex binary to conclude that transgender plaintiffs were not 
entitled to Title VII protection “based solely on their status as 
[transgender].”130 
In 2012, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) ruled that discriminating against someone based on transgender 
status constitutes discrimination based on sex, which violates Title VII.131  
Discrimination against a person based on transgender status may also contra-
 
 127. See EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574 
(6th Cir. 2018) (holding a funeral home’s decision to fire a transitioning, transgender 
employee violated Title VII); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of 
Ed., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. May 30, 2017) (holding that discrimination against 
transgender students constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
upon a theory of sexual-stereotyping); Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 
F. App’x 883, 891 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding a genuine issue of material fact existed as 
to whether gender bias motivated the firing of transgender plaintiff, which would 
violate Title VII); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
a transgender employee could bring a an equal protection claim because “discrimina-
tion against a transgender individual because of [their] gender nonconformity is sex 
discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender”), aff’g, 
724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding that transgender plaintiff stated a claim for sex discrimination 
“by alleging discrimination ... for [their] failure to conform to sex stereotypes”); 
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]iscrimination against 
a plaintiff who is . . . transgender . . . is no different from the discrimination directed 
against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not 
act like a woman.”); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining Gender Mo-
tivated Violence Act, which parallels the sex discrimination standard of Title VII, 
reaches conduct motivated by transgender identity and other gender nonconformity).   
 128. See, e.g., Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 528 (D. 
Conn. 2016) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because discrimina-
tion on the basis of transgender identity is cognizable under Title VII as sex discrimi-
nation); Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1015–16 (D. Nev. 
2016) (granting partial summary judgment for employee by finding employer dis-
criminated against transgender employee on the basis of his gender); Schroer v. Bil-
lington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding a revocation of a job offer “be-
cause of sex” constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII). 
 129. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 130. Id. at 1222. 
 131. Macy v. Dep’t of Justice, Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC April 20, 2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt. 
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vene the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).132  Though the FHA does not explicitly 
prohibit discrimination based on gender identity, discrimination against a 
transgender person based on non-conformity with gender stereotypes may be 
covered by the FHA’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex in accord-
ance with Price Waterhouse.133 
In 2014, then-Attorney General Eric Holder of the DOJ issued a policy 
memo that directed all Department of Justice Correspondents and United 
States Attorneys to “take the position in litigation that the protection of Title 
VII . . . extends to claims of discrimination based on an individual’s gender 
identity, including transgender status.”134  Holder explained, “This will help 
to foster fair and consistent treatment for all claimants throughout the gov-
ernment, in furtherance of this Department’s commitment to fair and impar-
tial justice for all Americans.”135  On October 4, 2017, Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions issued a memo reversing this policy, stating, “Title VII does not 
prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se.”136 
The civil rights of transgender individuals have become an increasingly 
salient issue.  The public’s and the media’s increased attention on the issue 
reflect this saliency, as do the aforementioned stances taken by federal agen-
cies like the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), 
the EEOC, and the DOJ.137  The recent increase in litigation concerning 
 
 132. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). 
 133. Ending Housing Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender Individuals and Their Families, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/LGBT_Housing_Disc
rimination (last visited June 26, 2018).  HUD also has an Equal Access Rule.  “In 
addition, housing providers that receive HUD funding or have loans insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as lenders insured by FHA, are sub-
ject to HUD’s Equal Access Rule, which requires equal access to HUD programs 
without regard to a person’s actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
marital status.”  Id. 
 134. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Holder Directs Dep’t to In-
clude Gender Identity Under Sex Discrimination Emp’t Claims (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-include-
gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination. See also Memorandum from the Attorney 
General to United States Attorneys Heads of Department Components 2 (Dec. 15, 
2014), http://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download. 
 135. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Holder Directs Dep’t to In-
clude Gender Identity Under Sex Discrimination Emp’t Claims (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-include-
gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination. 
 136. Memorandum from the Attorney General to United States Attorneys Heads 
of Department Components (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1006981/download (alteration in original). 
 137. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
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transgender rights in federal courts also reflects the growing saliency of the 
issue.138  
Since Price Waterhouse, Title VII has been instrumental in securing 
employment protections for transgender employees, but not all federal courts 
of appeal have held that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination includes 
discrimination based on transgender status or gender identity.139  Likewise, 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection have 
been held to protect transgender individuals in employment, education, mili-
tary service, and other matters, but their reach is limited to the constraint of 
the federal and state governments.140  While unquestionably necessary, nei-
ther Title VII nor the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment provides comprehen-
sive, nationwide protections for transgender individuals in certain crucial 
areas of the law, such as public accommodations.  Nor is there an explicit 
federal law protecting transgender individuals in public accommodations.141  
Instead, a patchwork of state and local laws provide some public accommo-
dations protection for transgender individuals.142 
 
 138. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 
F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C.), stay de-
nied by No. 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 6553389 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2017); Evancho v. 
Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Carcaño v. McCrory, 
203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Love v. Johnson, 146 
F. Supp. 3d 848 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 139. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 140. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; see also supra note 128. 
 141. Federal law does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in public 
accommodations, however the majority of states – forty-four and the District of Co-
lumbia – do.  NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND 




Many state courts and enforcement agencies have interpreted these laws to 
protect transgender people.  Many states and localities also explicitly prohibit 
discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation in public ac-
commodations.  The following 17 states have explicit protections: California, 
Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Maine, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Washington State, as well as the District of Columbia.  More than 
200 cities and counties also explicitly prohibit gender identity discrimination 
even if their state does not. 
 
Id. 
 142. See id. 
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F. States’ Attacks on Transgender Individuals 
The issue of transgender rights likely conjures thoughts of so-called 
state “bathroom bills” that seek to limit or deny transgender individuals’ abil-
ity to use restrooms that correspond with their gender identity.143  These bills 
represent only one facet of the fight for transgender rights, but their prolifera-
tion in state legislatures in recent years highlights the controversy that still 
surrounds those rights.  During the 2017 legislative session, sixteen states 
considered bathroom bills targeting transgender individuals.144  Moreover, six 
states in 2017 “considered legislation that would preempt municipal and 
county-level anti-discrimination laws.”145 
Proposed and enacted “bathroom bills” have ranged in scope; some 
merely prohibit transgender individuals from using restrooms that correspond 
to their gender identity, while others make the act a crime punishable by in-
carceration or a fine.146  For instance, Mark Jennings, a Representative in the 
Wyoming House, filed House Bill 244, which proposed that using a public 
restroom not corresponding to an individual’s gender assigned at birth consti-
tuted an act of public indecency punishable by up to six months’ imprison-
ment or a $750 fine.147 
State legislatures are not the only state authorities that have proposed or 
enacted bathroom bills.  American universities have also implemented bath-
room bills.  For example, in a 2015 case, campus police at the University of 
Pennsylvania arrested a transgender student because he used the men’s re-
 
 143. See Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking: 2017 State Legis-
lation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (July 28, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-
tracking635951130.aspx. 
 144. See Kralik, supra note 143.  The states are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri Montana, New York, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.  Id.  Human Rights 
Campaign tracked legislation in 2016, and of the more than 175 anti-LGBT bills 
tracked, forty-four were anti-trans, and twenty-nine of those forty-four specifically 
related to bathrooms or locker rooms.  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., ANTI-
TRANSGENDER LEGISLATION SPREADS NATIONWIDE, BILLS TARGETING TRANSGENDER 
CHILDREN SURGE 2 (Feb. 19, 2016), http://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC-
Anti-Trans-Issue-Brief-FINAL-REV2.pdf. 
 145. Kralik, supra note 143.  The six states are Missouri, Montana, North Caroli-
na, South Carolina, and Texas.  Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Arno Rosenfeld, Bill Would Amend Wyoming Civil Rights Law to Regu-
late Bathroom Use, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Jan 27, 2017), https://trib.com/news/state-
and-regional/govt-and-politics/bill-would-amend-wyoming-civil-rights-law-to-
regulate-bathroom/article_2a60c7b3-37cf-5963-9894-d669b6501b7b.html; see also 
H.B. 0244, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wy. 2017), 
http://www.wyoleg.gov/2017/Introduced/HB0244.pdf. 
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stroom.148  Following his arrest, the transgender student was expelled from 
the university.149  The university even filed criminal charges against him with 
the District Attorney’s office alleging indecent exposure, criminal trespass, 
and disorderly conduct.150 
Bathroom bills affect younger students in public primary and secondary 
schools as well.  Missouri is among the states that have recently undertaken 
the passage of bathroom bills that would affect K-12 students.  In 2017, Sen-
ate Bill 98, sponsored by Representative Ed Emery, proposed that students at 
K-12 public schools must use bathrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities 
that match their assigned gender at birth.151  The bill provided “accommoda-
tions” to transgender students in the form of “single-stall restrooms, access to 
unisex restrooms, or controlled use of faculty restrooms, locker rooms, or 
shower rooms.”152 
G. The Supreme Court Almost Weighs In 
In 2017, the United States Supreme Court almost took up the issue of 
transgender rights in G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester School Board.153  Spe-
cifically, G.G. concerned a young transgender man (Gavin Grimm) and 
whether he had the right to use the restroom at his high school that corre-
sponded with his gender identity.154  The case was brought because Grimm 
was prohibited from using the men’s restroom155 after his school board im-
plemented a policy requiring students to use restrooms consistent with their 
assigned gender at birth.156  Grimm challenged the policy, alleging discrimi-
nation in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.157 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed 
Grimm’s Title IX claims.158  However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal, giving deference to the Department of 
Education’s (“DOE’s”) interpretation of Title IX; in a letter from the DOE’s 
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), the DOE communicated that, under Title 
IX, “school[s] generally must treat transgender students consistent with their 
 
 148. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 
F. Supp. 3d 657, 663–64 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
 149. Id. at 664. 
 150. Id. 
 151. S. 98, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017), 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/17info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=5709
5306. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), vacated 
and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). 
 154. Id. at 714–15. 
 155. Id. at 714. 
 156. Id. at 716. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 717. 
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gender identity.”159  The position of the DOE was formalized in guidance 
issued jointly by the DOJ and the DOE in 2016.160  The joint guidance pro-
hibited schools receiving federal money from discriminating based on a stu-
dent’s sex, “including discrimination based on a student’s transgender sta-
tus.”161  The guidance explicitly directed federal agencies to treat a student’s 
gender identity as the student’s sex for purposes of enforcing Title IX.162 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision garnered a significant amount of attention 
in the media, and far more media attention followed when the United States 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.163  However, on February 22, 2017, 
the DOJ and the DOE withdrew their joint guidance regarding treatment of 
transgender students.164  In light of the withdrawn guidance, the Court vacat-
ed the Fourth Circuit’s decision – a decision that relied on the aforementioned 
OCR letter that mirrored the position of the later-adopted joint guidance – 
 
 159. Id. at 718; see also CATHERINE E. LHAMON, DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY CLASSES AND 
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES ¶ 31 (Dec. 1, 2014), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/faqs-title-ix-single-sex-201412.pdf 
(recognizing transgender students should be treated consistent with their gender iden-
tity for purposes of same-sex classes); Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting 




 160. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., and Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assitant Attorney Gen. for Civil 
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Colleague (May 13, 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-
transgender.pdf (asserting schools must “treat the student consistent with 
the student’s gender identity”).  According to the Department of Education’s website, 
that joint guidance was disseminated to “ensure that all students, including 
transgender students, can attend school in an environment free from discrimination 
based on sex.”  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., U.S. Departments of Education 
and Justice Release Joint Guidance to Help Schools Ensure the Civil Rights of 
Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-
departments-education-and-justice-release-joint-guidance-help-schools-ensure-civil-
rights-transgender-students. 
 161. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, supra note 160, at 1. 
 162. Id. at 2. 
 163. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bathroom Case Puts Transgender Student on 
National Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/gavin-grimm-transgender-rights-
bathroom.html. 
 164. Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., and T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Colleague (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/942021/download. 
23
Payne: A Narrow Escape: Transcending the GID Exclusion in the Americans
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
822 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
and remanded the case.165  While this was a disappointing moment for many 
transgender individuals and their advocates, it is almost surely not the last 
time the Court will take up the issue of transgender rights, whether in the 
context of access to restrooms or otherwise. 
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Cabela’s 
motion to dismiss, holding that Blatt’s condition of Gender Dysphoria was 
not excluded from coverage under § 12211 of the ADA.166  Recall that Blatt 
alleged she was either covered under the ADA or the ADA’s exclusions vio-
lated her right to equal protection.167  Had the court held the ADA excluded 
Blatt from coverage, it would have been forced to rule on the constitutionality 
of the ADA’s GID Exclusion.168  Citing its obligation under the constitution-
al-avoidance canon,169 the court rationalized a “fairly possible” construction 
of the ADA’s GID Exclusion under which it did not need to address the con-
stitutional issue.170 
The court concluded that reading the phrase “gender identity disorders” 
narrowly to refer to merely “the state of identifying with a [gender other than 
the one assigned at birth]” was a fair interpretation of the GID Exclusion.171  
Gender Dysphoria, the court said, “goes beyond” merely identifying with a 
gender other than the one assigned at birth and is “characterized by clinically 
significant stress and other impairments that may be disabling.”172 
In adopting this narrow interpretation of “gender identity disorders,” the 
court first looked at the text of § 12211.173  The court noted two distinct cate-
gories of exclusion: “non-disabling conditions that concern sexual orientation 
or identity,” such as homosexuality and bisexuality, and “disabling conditions 
that are associated with harmful or illegal conduct,” such as pyromania and 
 
 165. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) 
(mem.) (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of the guidance document 
issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 
2017.”). 
 166. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
 167. Id. at *2. 
 168. See id. 
 169. “[E]ven if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal princi-
ple that [the court] will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided.”  Id. (citing United States v. Witko-
vich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957)). 
 170. Id. at *2–4. 
 171. Id. at *4. 
 172. Id. at *2. 
 173. Id. at *3 n.2. 
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kleptomania.174  The court reasoned that if it adopted Cabela’s proffered theo-
ry of exclusion, then it would create internal incongruence in the statute, as it 
would exclude a disabling condition (Gender Dysphoria) that is not associat-
ed with harmful or illegal conduct.175 
Under the narrower definition of “gender identity disorders” adopted by 
the court, no such internal incongruence would arise because “gender identity 
disorders” would belong to the first category of exclusions encompassing 
non-disabling conditions that concern “sexual orientation or identity.”176 
In support of its conclusion, the court emphasized the legislative history 
of § 12211.  The court stated that § 12211 revealed Congress’ careful inten-
tion to distinguish between excluding certain identities from the scope of the 
ADA (homosexuality, for instance) on one hand, and not excluding disabling 
conditions that individuals with those identities might have on the other.177  
 The court further explained that its narrow interpretation comported 
with the Third Circuit’s mandate that the ADA be “broadly construed to ef-
fectuate its purposes” as “a remedial statute designed to eliminate discrimina-
tion against the disabled in all facets of society.”178  The court reasoned that, 
under the Third Circuit’s instruction, exceptions “such as those listed in [§] 
12211 should be read narrowly to give the statute a broad reach.”179 
 
 174. Id. at *3. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.  It should be noted that sexual orientation/identity is different from gender 
identity.  See GLAAD Guide, supra note 77.  Judge Leeson refers to “non-disabling 
conditions that concern sexual orientation or identity,” and one presumes “identity” as 
used by Judge Leeson in this context refers to sexual identity.  See Blatt, 2017 WL 
2178123, at *3.  Nonetheless, Judge Leeson states that “gender identity disorders” 
belongs in the first category of non-disabling conditions just described.  Id.  Thus, one 
can also presume that Judge Leeson intended to refer to a category of exclusion en-
compassing non-disabling conditions that concern both sexual orientation and gender 
identity.  See id. 
 177. Id.  For instance, the legislative record demonstrates that legislators agreed 
that homosexuality was not to be considered a disability, but a gay person with HIV 
would not be excluded from ADA protection because HIV is a disabling condition, 
and thus the individual would be entitled to protection on that ground.  See 135 CONG. 
REC. S10765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), Cong. Rec S 10767, at 1989 WL 183216. 
 178. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *3 (citing Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
(2012). 
 179. Id. at *3 (citing Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., 787 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“Following traditional canons of statutory interpretation, remedial statutes 
should be construed broadly to extend coverage and their exclusions or exceptions 
should be construed narrowly.”)).  The Code of Federal Regulations, as well as other 
courts to address similar issues, likewise dictate that the ADA should be construed 
broadly in favor of expansive coverage.  See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2012) 
(“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive 
coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.”). 
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V. COMMENT 
This Part first explores how the instant decision’s legal reasoning aligns 
with contemporary medical standards.  This Part then addresses the potential 
arguments against the decision reached by the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia in Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.  Next, this Part explores the importance 
and limitations of the DOJ’s Second Statement of Interest in Blatt and further 
argues that it articulates another viable method through which transgender 
individuals with Gender Dysphoria could be encompassed by the protections 
of the ADA.  This Part then discusses the position of amici curiae in Blatt and 
argues that it, too, presents a viable method by which Gender Dysphoria 
could be encompassed by the protections of the ADA.  Finally, this Part ad-
dresses the manifold ways the public and legal spheres will change if individ-
uals with Gender Dysphoria are entitled to ADA protection. 
A. A Landmark Ruling 
For twenty-five years, the ADA’s exclusion of transgender individuals 
stood relatively unchallenged.180  The instant case marks the first time that a 
federal court has held the ADA does not categorically bar a transgender indi-
vidual from coverage.181  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision is 
significant not only for holding that a transgender plaintiff with Gender Dys-
phoria can sue under the ADA, but also for the reasoning underlying its deci-
sion. 
In Blatt, Judge Leeson delivered two important conclusions: (1) that be-
ing transgender is not, in itself, a medical condition or disability182 and (2) 
that Gender Dysphoria – the stress that can accompany being transgender – is 
a medical condition and a covered disability.183  In so concluding, Judge 
Leeson drew an important line between identifying with a gender other than 
 
 180. Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, A Landmark Victory for Trans Rights – Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, SLATE (May 24, 2017, 12:27 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/05/24/a_landmark_victory_for_trans_right
s_under_the_ada.html; but see Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 996 (N.D. 
Ohio 2003), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing a transgender employ-
ee’s sex discrimination claim despite the employee’s argument that her GID resulted 
from a physical impairment and therefore should not be barred from coverage under 
the GID Exclusion). 
 181. Barry & Levi, supra note 180. 
 182. Id.  Judge Leeson does not explicitly state that being transgender is not a 
disability.  See generally Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123.  Nonetheless, Judge Leeson 
reaches this conclusion.  See id. at 4.  The opinion articulates the mere state of identi-
fying with a gender other than the gender assigned at birth (i.e., being transgender) 
belongs to the non-disabling category of exclusion.  Id. at *4.  Thus, one assumes that 
in placing transgender status in the non-disabling category, it is not considered a disa-
bility.  See id. 
 183. Barry & Levi, supra note 180. 
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the one assigned at birth and the clinically significant stress that can accom-
pany one’s gender identity.184 
Judge Leeson’s decision was praised by advocates for this distinction, 
which aligns with contemporary medical standards.185  The DSM-V has shift-
ed away from labeling or implying that transgender people are mentally ill.186  
“Gender Dysphoria” replaced the term “Gender Identity Disorder” in the 
DSM-V to facilitate an understanding that being transgender is not, in itself, a 
mental condition.187  In contrast, the clinically significant stress that can result 
from being transgender is a medical condition.188  When the change was im-
plemented in 2013, the APA wrote, “DSM-[V] aims to avoid stigma and en-
sure clinical care for individuals who see and feel themselves to be a different 
gender than their assigned gender. . . .  It is important to note that gender 
nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder.”189  Thus, Judge Leeson’s 
opinion reflects the prevailing views of one of the nation’s foremost authori-
ties on mental health and mental conditions – the APA190 – and his decision 
has been acknowledged for its conformity with these prevailing medical 
views.191 
However, because not all transgender people have Gender Dysphoria, 
Blatt may not benefit the entire transgender community.  Absent a showing 
that a transgender individual was discriminated against because they were 
regarded as having Gender Dysphoria, a plaintiff that does not experience 
Gender Dysphoria would not be protected by the ADA.192  In this way, Blatt 
may appear to be a peculiar decision.  It may strike one as perplexing to im-
agine that an employer could discriminate against two transgender employees 
in precisely the same way, but only the employee that does or is thought to 
experience Gender Dysphoria would be protected under the statute.  Applica-
tion of Blatt may therefore be complicated given that many transgender peo-
ple do not, in fact, experience Gender Dysphoria.193  Thus, Blatt does not 
 
 184. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra Section III.A. 
 187. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 1 (2013), 
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-
V-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. (emphasis added). 
 190. “APA is a national medical specialty society whose more than 37,000 physi-
cian members specialize in the diagnosis, treatment, prevention and research of men-
tal illnesses, including substance use disorders.”  Id. at 2. 
 191. See Barry & Levi, supra note 180. 
 192. See supra note 51. 
 193. As explored in Section III.A of this Note, transgender is an umbrella term 
and there are various gender identities that fall under this umbrella.  One might think 
of transgender men or women, but the gender identity spectrum extends far beyond 
this limited, binary conception.  See GLAAD Guide supra note 77.  Many individuals 
in the umbrella do not experience Gender Dysphoria.  See Brief of Amici Curiae, 
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render the GID Exclusion obsolete; an adoption of Blatt nationwide would 
mean the exclusion simply denies ADA protection to a distinct section of the 
transgender community – those who do not and are not assumed to suffer 
from Gender Dysphoria. 
However, this result comports with the purpose of the ADA – to provide 
legal protections for individuals with disabling conditions.194  Without the 
presence of a disabling condition like Gender Dysphoria (or a discriminatory 
action under the presumption of Gender Dysphoria195), invocation of the 
ADA would be improper, as the relief sought would be beyond the ADA’s 
scope and purpose. 
Blatt begs practical questions as well.  Presumably, transgender plain-
tiffs with Gender Dysphoria need to prove their disability in some way – but 
how?  Must they have an official diagnosis?  Not everyone can afford medi-
cal care, including the ability to be officially diagnosed by a medical or men-
tal health professional.  Moreover, the necessity of an official diagnosis may 
present problems for transgender individuals who live in areas in which med-
ical or mental health providers refuse to provide them service precisely be-
cause they are transgender and have Gender Dysphoria.196  Thus, if one is 
unable to travel to a non-discriminatory doctor or psychiatrist,197 the very 
reason an individual is entitled to protection under the ADA may be the rea-
son they are unable to prove that entitlement.  No such evidentiary issue was 
presented in Blatt because Blatt had an official diagnosis, but that may not 
always be the case.  Future courts may have to grapple with these kinds of 
questions. 
 
supra note 9, at 3–4.  Individuals who are non-binary, gender-fluid, genderqueer, or 
agender may not experience Gender Dysphoria.  Though empirical studies have not 
attempted to understand a correlation between particular gender identities and the 
experience of Gender Dysphoria, it is possible that one subset of the transgender pop-
ulation experiences Gender Dysphoria less regularly than another. 
 194. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012). 
 195. A person treated adversely based on Gender Dysphoria, whether real or per-
ceived, would be covered under the ADA’s regarded-as prong, as amended.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2012). 
 196. Shabab Ahmed Mirza & Caitlin Rooney, Discrimination Prevents LGBTQ 
People from Accessing Health Care, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2018, 
9:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2018/01/18/445130/discriminatio
n-prevents-lgbtq-people-accessing-health-care/.  The Center for American Progress 
stated that twenty-nine percent of transgender respondents reported that a doctor or 
health care provider had refused them an appointment because they were transgender.  
Id. 
 197. Twenty-nine percent of transgender respondents had to travel more than 
twenty-five miles or more to access transition-related care.  Id. 
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B. Arguments Against Judge Leeson’s Interpretation of the GID Exclu-
sion 
One argument against Judge Leeson’s interpretation of the GID Exclu-
sion is that the legislature intended to exclude transgender people from ADA 
protection. However, this argument ultimately provides little cause to reject 
the reasoning in Blatt.  The legislative record makes clear that lawmakers 
intended to ensure that LGBT people were not considered disabled because 
they are LGBT.198  However, those same lawmakers discussed that LGBT 
status should not preclude coverage for LGBT people who also happen to 
have disabling conditions.199  Blatt does not stray from this intent – Blatt is 
covered not because she is transgender, but because she has a disabling con-
dition.200 
One could also quibble that Gender Dysphoria is not disabling; howev-
er, the text of the ADA and medical literature, including the definition of 
Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-V, support Judge Leeson’s finding that Gen-
der Dysphoria is, in fact, disabling.201  To be diagnosed with Gender Dyspho-
ria, an individual must have “clinically significant []stress or impairment in 
occupational, social, or other important areas of functioning” that is present 
for at least six months.202  By definition under the ADA, significant social 
and occupational impairment constitutes a disability.203 
Another argument against Judge Leeson’s interpretation of the GID Ex-
clusion is that “gender identity disorders not resulting from impairment” 
should be interpreted to include Gender Dysphoria.  This argument is not 
especially strong.  Recall that Judge Leeson defined “gender identity disor-
ders” as merely the state of identifying with a gender other than the one as-
signed at birth, and thus held the phrase did not include a condition like Gen-
der Dysphoria.204 
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Leeson took a classic interpretive ap-
proach and construed the statute so as to render it internally consistent.205  As 
 
 198. See 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), Cong. Rec S 
10767, at 1989 WL 183216; see also Barry, supra note 108, at 24–25. 
 199. See 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01, Cong. Rec S 10767, at 1989 WL 183216.  
“Congress was careful to distinguish between excluding certain sexual identities from 
the ADA’s definition of disability, on one hand, and not excluding disabling condi-
tions that persons of those identities might have, on the other hand.”  Blatt v. Cabela’s 
Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
 200. Id. at *4. 
 201. See DSM-V, supra note 4, § 302.6, at 455. 
 202. Id. at 451–53. 
 203. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).  “Concentrating, thinking, communicating 
and working” are all listed as major life activities, the substantial impairment of 
which renders the condition from which they are caused to be a disability under the 
ADA.  Id. 
 204. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4. 
 205. Id. at *3. 
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Judge Leeson recognized, the statute creates two categories of exceptions.206  
The first deals with “non-disabling conditions that concern sexual orientation 
or gender identity,” and the second concerns disabling conditions that are 
“associated with harmful or illegal conduct.”207  Judge Leeson rightly deter-
mined that to exclude Gender Dysphoria “would exclude from the ADA con-
ditions that are actually disabling but that are not associated with harmful or 
illegal conduct.”208  Therefore, including Gender Dysphoria in the definition 
of “gender identity disorders” would create an anomalous result.  Conse-
quently, an argument that the GID Exclusion should encompass Gender Dys-
phoria lacks convincing support.209 
C. The DOJ Says Gender Dysphoria is Covered Under the ADA 
The DOJ took an official position in its Second Statement of Interest 
that ultimately aligned with Judge Leeson’s holding that Gender Dysphoria is 
a disabling condition covered under the ADA.210  However, unlike Judge 
Leeson’s decision, the DOJ’s position was not based on a narrow interpreta-
tion of the ADA’s exclusion, and it provides another rationale that supports 
the conclusion that Gender Dysphoria is a protected disability under the 
ADA. 
The ADA excludes “gender identity disorders not resulting from physi-
cal impairment.”211  In its Second Statement of Interest, the DOJ recognized 
the contemporary medical view that suggests Gender Dysphoria has roots in 
biology and physiology.212  In relevant part, the Second Statement of Interest 
reads: “[U]nder a reasonable interpretation of the statute, Plaintiff’s [G]ender 
[D]ysphoria falls outside of the scope of the GID Exclusion because a grow-
ing body of scientific evidence suggests that it may ‘result[] from [a] physical 
impairment[].’”213  Quoting the amici curiae in the case, the DOJ endorsed 
the view that “burgeoning medical research underlying [Gender Dysphoria] 
points to a physical etiology.”214 
Physiological and biological roots arguably fall under the “physical im-
pairment” caveat of the GID Exclusion.  The ADA itself does not define the 
phrase “not resulting from physical impairment.”215  However, the ADA is 
construed to provide at least as much protection as the regulations implement-
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at *3. 
 210. Second Statement of Interest, supra note 72, at 5–6. 
 211. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 212. Second Statement of Interest, supra note 72, at 3. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 
15). 
 215. Id. at 2. 
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ing the Rehabilitation Act,216 which define “physical impairment” to mean 
“‘[a]ny physiological disorder or condition’ affecting various body systems 
including ‘neurological,’ ‘reproductive,’ or ‘genitourinary.’”217   Further, the 
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act explain that “physical im-
pairment” was designed to include “any condition which is . . . physical but 
whose precise nature is not at present known.”218  Thus, the DOJ argued, the 
term “physical impairment,” if properly construed, leaves room for scientific 
developments.219  Given the burgeoning science, “the remedial nature of the 
ADA” and the broad reading of “physical impairment,” the DOJ asserted 
“that [G]ender [D]ysphoria falls outside [the GID Exclusion’s] scope” and 
therefore “[s]hould not be excluded from the ADA's definition of ‘disabil-
ity.’”220 
This official stance taken by the DOJ is profound.  It perhaps marks the 
first time that the federal government has recognized and urged in an official 
capacity that Gender Dysphoria has roots in physiology.  The DOJ’s Second 
Statement of Interest is important in another respect – given the DOJ’s pres-
tige and authority, it may increase the likelihood that future courts hearing 
ADA complaints from transgender individuals adopt Judge Leeson’s view 
that Gender Dysphoria is not excluded from ADA protection. 
Even if courts reject Judge Leeson’s narrow interpretation of the term 
“gender identity disorders,” adoption of the DOJ’s position would take Gen-
der Dysphoria out of the purview of the ADA’s exclusion of “gender identity 
disorders not resulting from physical impairment.”221  If Gender Dysphoria is 
said to be a “gender identity disorder” but is recognized by courts as having 
roots in physiology (i.e., resulting from physical impairment), then the exclu-
sion would not apply.222 
In reply to the DOJ’s Second Statement of Interest, a statement was filed 
by a prominent group of LGBT advocacy organizations serving as amici curi-
ae in the case.223  In this statement, the amici agreed that Gender Dysphoria is 
not excluded by the GID Exclusion.224  However, the amici asserted, as they 
did in a previously filed brief,225 that this is because Gender Dysphoria is not 
 
 216. Id. at 3 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1998)). 
 217. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2012)). 
 218. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 C.F.R. §§ 84.62–84.99 (1977)). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 5–6.  
 221. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 222. See id. 
 223. Statement of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Mazzoni 
Center, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Center for Transgender Equali-
ty, National LQBTQ Task Force, and Transgender Law Center in Response to Second 
Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., 
No. 5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2015), 2015 WL 9907588 [hereinafter State-
ment of Amici Curiae in Response]. 
 224. Id. at. 1. 
 225. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 13. 
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a “gender identity disorder” at all; instead, it is a separate, “new and different 
diagnosis that does not fall within the letter or spirit of the GID Exclu-
sion.”226  Amici noted that the GID Exclusion prohibits coverage for certain 
“gender identity disorders” but says nothing of Gender Dysphoria.227  As of 
the DSM’s revision in 2013, the amici argued, Gender Identity Disorder and 
“gender identity disorders” no longer exist; “there is only Gender Dyspho-
ria.”228 
Amici supported this argument by detailing that when Gender Dyspho-
ria replaced GID in the DSM-V, the APA did more than rename the diagnosis 
– “it revised the diagnostic criteria underlying the diagnosis, it re-categorized 
the diagnosis within the DSM, and it referenced new science supporting the 
physiological etiology of the diagnosis.”229  Therefore, as a matter of statuto-
ry interpretation, the amici made a strong argument that Gender Dysphoria 
does not fall under any definition of “gender identity disorder” and is com-
pletely outside the purview of the GID Exclusion.230  The amici opined that 
the DOJ ignored “significant differences” between GID and Gender Dyspho-
ria but nonetheless agreed with the “thrust of the United States’ position” that 
Gender Dysphoria “falls outside the scope of the GID Exclusion.”231 
Whatever reasoning one might find most persuasive, the ultimate con-
clusion drawn by Judge Leeson, the DOJ, and amici curiae is the same: Gen-
der Dysphoria is a protected disability under the ADA. 
D. A New Legal Landscape Under Blatt 
Blatt is a profound decision with vast implications.  For those with Gen-
der Dysphoria, a new world will emerge if Judge Leeson’s interpretation of 
the ADA232 prevails in other courts around the country – a world marked by 
an exponential increase in legal protections.  Transgender individuals with 
Gender Dysphoria who face discrimination in myriad facets of life would 
finally have a means to access the protection Congress and many states refuse 
to enact through targeted legislation. 
If courts interpret the ADA to include protection for transgender indi-
viduals with Gender Dysphoria, public accommodations nationwide would no 
longer have carte blanche to deny transgender individuals service or the right 
to use restrooms consistent with their gender identity.233  This would be par-
 
 226. Statement of Amici Curiae in Response, supra note 223, at 2. 
 227. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012). 
 228. Statement of Amici Curiae in Response, supra note 223, at 2 n.1. 
 229. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 15. 
 230. See id. at 20–24. 
 231. Statement of Amici Curiae in Response, supra note 223, at 2–3. 
 232. Implications are equally vast under the DOJ and amici’s reasoning, each 
concluding that Gender Dysphoria falls outside the purview of the GID Exclusion.  
See supra Section IV.C. 
 233. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012) (“No individual shall be discriminated 
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, ser-
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ticularly groundbreaking because private entities such as hotels, movie thea-
ters, restaurants, stadiums, grocery stores, shopping centers, banks, pharma-
cies, lawyers’ and doctors’ offices, hospitals, and more are considered public 
accommodations so long as their “operations . . . affect commerce.”234  Given 
the far-reaching protections of the ADA, adopting Blatt nationwide would 
have a powerful effect on the daily lives of transgender individuals. 
Moreover, a nationwide adoption of Blatt would likely have a profound 
effect on young transgender individuals attending primary, secondary, and 
post-secondary school who are threatened with discrimination.235  In recent 
years, an increasing number of lawsuits have been filed that challenge school 
board prohibitions regarding the use of restrooms that match a student’s gen-
 
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 
public accommodation.”). 
 234. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).  Under the ADA, all of 
 
[t]he following private entities are considered public accommodations . . . if 
the operations of such entities affect commerce[:] (A) an inn, hotel, motel, or 
other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building 
that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually oc-
cupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such propri-
etor; (B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; (C) a 
motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibi-
tion or entertainment; (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or 
other place of public gathering; (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, 
hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment; (F) a 
laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe 
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, 
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hos-
pital, or other service establishment; (G) a terminal, depot, or other station 
used for specified public transportation; (H) a museum, library, gallery, or 
other place of public display or collection; (I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or 
other place of recreation; (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, 
or postgraduate private school, or other place of education; (K) a day care cen-
ter, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or 
other social service center establishment; (L) and a gymnasium, health spa, 
bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation. 
 
Id.  “The term ‘commerce’ means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or 
communication – (A) among the several States; (B) between any foreign country or 
any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in the same State but 
through another State or foreign country.”  Id. § 12181(1). 
 235. See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Gavin Grimm Just Wanted to Use the Bathroom. 
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der identity.236  Under Blatt, a university, high school, elementary, or other 
school policy categorically prohibiting transgender students from using re-
strooms that match their gender identity would not be permissible.  Indeed, 
under Blatt, even private universities not receiving federal funds would be 
prohibited from implementing “bathroom bills” or policies that target 
transgender individuals so long as such entities properly fit within the de-
scription of a “public accommodation.”237  Moreover, if a nationwide consen-
sus aligned with Blatt takes hold, “bathroom bills” could not be enacted by 
state legislatures. 
E. Eliminating Discrimination in Employment 
The ADA applies to certain private employers with more than fifteen 
employees, state and local governments, employment agencies, labor unions, 
agents of an employer and joint management labor committees.238  The ADA 
prohibits discrimination in a wide variety of employment practices, including 
hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, training, and more.239  Currently, 
there are states in which laws do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity.240  In those states, individuals can be fired simply for being 
transgender.  If no binding, favorable federal court precedent exists in the 
jurisdiction upon which a transgender person could rely, no legal recourse for 
a termination or other adverse action would be available.  The logic and hold-
ing of the instant case would change such a result. 
As Blatt suggests, transgender individuals are often fired because they 
are transgender.241  It is not difficult to imagine that prejudice against 
transgender individuals likely also biases employers against giving promo-
tions to transgender employees, even when their job performance is stellar.242  
It likely happens to transgender individuals across the country.  ADA protec-
tion for transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria would be a crucial 
 
 236. See, e.g., Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267 (W.D. 
Pa. 2017); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 
F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
 237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 238. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2)–(5) (2012). 
 239. Id. § 12112(a) (2012). 
 240. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, STATE EMPLOYMENT NON-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (June. 21, 2018), http://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-
nondisc-employment.pdf.  States without legislation prohibiting discrimination 
against transgender employees include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 241. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 
(6th Cir. 2018). 
 242. See First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 25. 
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step toward ensuring equal employment opportunity for all transgender work-
ers. 
F. Healthcare and Incarceration 
For transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria, access to healthcare 
can be critical to mental and physical health.  A nationwide adoption of Blatt 
would be profound for transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria in the 
healthcare context because it would prohibit any “pharmacy, insurance office, 
professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service estab-
lishment” from discriminating against a transgender individual with Gender 
Dysphoria.243 
This means that a pharmacy could not refuse to provide hormones, a 
doctor/hospital could not refuse to provide medical care, and an insurance 
office could not refuse to provide service to a transgender individual with 
Gender Dysphoria based on their condition.244  Protections of this sort are 
imperative for transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria and may be 
particularly vital in areas with few providers or in areas where religious-based 
refusal of care is common. 
Blatt would also be transformative for transgender people who are in-
carcerated.  Often, prisons and jails refuse to house transgender individuals 
according to their gender identity.245  This practice can subject transgender 
people to physical and sexual violence as well as harassment.246  In June 
2018, a federal court in Doe v. Massachusetts declined to dismiss the lawsuit 
of a transgender woman being housed in a men’s prison based on the GID 
Exclusion, ruling instead that the woman could proceed with her ADA 
claim.247  The judge found that Doe “adequately stated a claim under the 
ADA” and “adequately pled that she ha[d] been denied the reasonable ac-
 
 243. These entities, even if private, are considered places of public accommoda-
tion under the ADA, provided they affect commerce.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) 
(2012). 
 244. A proliferation of Blatt nationwide would be especially important if so-called 
“religious freedom” bills are enacted at the state level, giving healthcare providers the 
legal authorization to refuse to provide care to someone in any instance in which their 
gender identity/expression offends a provider’s personal feelings about morality 
and/or religion. 
 245. See Megan McLemore, US Bureau of Prisons Policy Change Endangers 
Transgender Prisoners, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/us-bureau-prisons-policy-change-endangers-
transgender-prisoners. 
 246. More than one in three transgender women have been sexually victimized 
according to Prison Rape Elimination Act data.  Id.  In a national survey, transgender 
prisoners reported “physical and sexual assault rates six to [ten] times higher than 
non-transgender prisoners.”  Id.  See also ALLEN J. BECK, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN 
PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES  2011-12, (2013). 
 247. No. CV 17-12255-RGS, 2018 WL 2994403, at *8 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018). 
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commodation of a transfer to a woman’s prison.”248  Doe demonstrates the 
significance of rulings in line with Blatt and illustrates the meaningful and 
potentially life-saving effects of recognizing Gender Dysphoria as a disability 
entitled to ADA protection. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ADA is a fundamental piece of civil rights legislation.  Its scope is 
vast, guaranteeing equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities in public 
accommodations, employment, transportation, state and local government 
services, and telecommunications.249  While the prohibition on sex discrimi-
nation found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and elsewhere encompasses 
transgender individuals in many jurisdictions, the current patchwork of pro-
tections is inadequate for protecting the rights of all transgender individuals 
in the United States.  Without explicit federal legislation that provides protec-
tions on the basis of gender identity and transgender status, one can expect 
that transgender individuals will continue to face discrimination by states, 
businesses, and individuals alike.  For this reason, existing federal legislation 
like the ADA that can be properly construed to protect transgender individu-
als may play an important role in the developing legal landscape. 
Though the ADA codified harmful and unnecessary prejudice against 
transgender individuals in the GID Exclusion, the instant decision by the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania marks what could be the first rumbling of a 
seismic legal shift.  If other courts follow the decision of Judge Leeson, 
transgender individuals may soon find that they are indeed afforded the 
sweeping protections of the ADA. 
 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (1990) (amended 2008). 
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